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Corporate Insolvency and Employment 
Protection: A Theoretical Perspective 
 





When a company faced with financial difficulties finally enters formal insolvency, 
several creditor interests are affected. However, the relationship between employees and 
their employer is more threatened as companies faced with insolvency usually consider 
cutting labour costs as a mode of restructuring. Other stakeholder interests and mutual 
expectations such as continuity of employment may be severely altered or cease to exist 
completely where the company is either liquidated or sold as a going concern. This may 
prompt various parties with interests in that company to pursue and recover their 
interests against the debtor company. However, secured creditors such as banks with 
privately agreed contractual arrangements may choose to pursue their interests by 
exercising those contractual rights, usually to the detriment of general unsecured 
creditors like employees. This raises questions as to whose interest should insolvency 
law seek to protect on corporate insolvency? In other words, what the legitimate aim or 
goal of insolvency is or ought to be on corporate insolvency. This article will analyse 
two insolvency specific theories namely; the Creditors’ Bargain Theory (CBT) and the 
Team Production Theory of Corporate Reorganizations (TPT) and two general theories 
namely; Marxist Legal Theory and Dworkin’s Interpretative Theory of Law, to examine 
their normative position on the treatment of employees on corporate insolvency and the 
impact they would impose on the drive to rescue insolvent but viable businesses. The 
two general theories (Marxist Legal Theory and Dworkin’s Interpretative Theory) will 
be analysed in light of insolvencies to establish whether their normative perspectives 
may inform law and policy justifications on corporate insolvency in a non–specific 
insolvency perspective. The article will conclude by analysing what the legitimate goal 
of insolvency law ought to be if a balanced approach to stakeholder interest 
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Introduction 
 
1 For centuries, there have been various debates from insolvency scholars, academics 
and practitioners1 on what the legitimate goal of insolvency law is or ought to be. One 
of the leading scholars of insolvency, Professor Baird is of the view that engaging 
debates on insolvency law’s legitimate goal are mainly contested between two 
theoretical stands namely; the traditionalists and the proceduralists.2  
 
2 The proceduralists look at insolvency law’s main objective as a means of maximisation 
of value for creditors and therefore their approach can be viewed as creditor - biased. 
They contend that insolvency law should focus on addressing issues that only arise out 
of bankruptcy.3 They believe that non-insolvency claims or entitlements should not be 
protected by insolvency law unless doing so would maximise value for creditors.4 They 
prefer using economic models as a basis for analysing corporate insolvency and market 
solutions, as opposed to seeking judicial intervention based on vague standards of 
fairness for resolving issues arising on corporate insolvency.5  
 
3 Traditionalists, however, take a stand that is opposite to that of the proceduralists in 
that they advocate a more inclusive approach to stakeholder interest consideration during 
corporate insolvency. They believe that all interests should be given equal weight of 
consideration on corporate insolvency.6 They are against the notion that insolvency law 
exists to only serve the interests of creditors. In light of these varying views, there is a 
theoretical deadlock as to the legitimate aim of insolvency law. A consensus is yet to be 
reached. However, it should be noted that these normative views between the 
traditionalists and proceduralists have been transposed into various extant insolvency 
law theories.  These theories may be used for solving disputes during corporate 
insolvency. 
                                                 
* Hamiisi Junior Nsuguba B.A., LL.B, PGDL, LL.M is a PhD candidate at Nottingham Law School, 
Nottingham Trent University. 
1 C. W. Mooney Jr, “A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy Law As (Is) Civil Procedure” 
Univ. of Penn. Law School, Institute for Law and Economics, Research Paper No. 03 -27 (2003); 
Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. 775; E Warren, ‘ Bankruptcy 
Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 387; D. R. Korobkin, 
“Contractarianism and the normative foundations of bankruptcy law” (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 554; D. 
Baird & T. H. Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A 
Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chicago L. Rev. 97. 
2 D.G. Baird, “The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations” (1986) 15 Journal of Leg. Stud. 127, 
133. 
3 Please note that the term bankruptcy is used differently in the US and the UK. In the UK, the term 
bankruptcy is used to refer to a situation where a person is unable to pay his debts and therefore faced 
with bankruptcy. The term insolvency is used to refer to a company that is unable to pay its debts. 
However, in the US bankruptcy is used to refer to both a person and a company being unable to pay their 
debts. 
4 C. W. Mooney Jr, “A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy Law As (Is) Civil Procedure” 
Univ. of Penn. Law School, Institute for Law and Economics, Research Paper No. 03 -27 (2003).  
5 See for instance, R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1983) pp 60 – 87 on his 
account of wealth maximisation as an ethical principle, a typical law and economics perspective. 
6 D. R. Korobkin, “Contractarianism and the normative foundations of bankruptcy law” (1993) 71 Tex. 
L. Rev. 554. 
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Select Insolvency  Theories 
 
4 A theory is a factual concept or framework describing a given phenomenon, the way 
it is or it ought to be.7 Where theories are used in insolvency disciplines, they are 
explored as normative phenomena as they prescribe methods of evaluation as to why 
insolvency is the way it is or ought to be in a given state or society.8 Although it may be 
argued that theories on their own cannot solve underlying issues in a given state, they 
can however provide the basis upon which substantive insolvency laws and policies in 
different jurisdictions are prescribed or evaluated. 
 
5 In attempts to explain the legitimate provinces and objectives of insolvency law to be 
pursued in any jurisdiction, several theories have been put forward by various academic 
theorists. These include for example; The Value Based Theory from the academic 
wisdom of Korobkin9, Communitarianism10 and the Multiple Value Approach,11 among 
other theories. However, for the purpose of this article, two normative insolvency 
specific theories namely; The Creditors Bargain Theory (CBT) and the Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Reorganizations (TPT) and two general (non-insolvency) theories 
namely; Marxist Legal Theory and Dworkin’s Interpretative Theory of Law will be 
discussed and analysed. The applicability of these theories to the treatment of employees 
on corporate insolvency will be analysed and it will be considered whether insolvency 
laws and policies modelled on their normative theoretical perspectives would be 
advantageous to employment protection over business rescue.  
 
6 The main reason for these four selected theories is that, both the CBT and TPT are 
contractarian theories.12 However, the CBT is premised on the creditors’ primacy and 
wealth maximisation norms – a typical proceduralist approach to corporate insolvency. 
The TPT, although contractarian in nature, it is a social contractarian theory.13 It is 
premised on the traditionalist view which recognises the interests of all parties to the 
company as a whole on corporate insolvency. The theory sees all interest holders as team 
members who join resources together to achieve the end product or service. 
 
7 On the other hand, Dworkin’s interpretative theory of law is chosen as it offers a 
normative approach to how laws, policies or practices should be interpreted in a more 
principled approach, drawing upon social ideals like moral obligation, value and purpose 
                                                 
7 Brian H. Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context, (6th edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London 2012) 4.  
8 D.R. Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Texas 
L. Rev. 98. 
9 See Ronald R. Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) Colum. L. 
Rev. 717. 
10 See Karen Gross, ‘Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy An Essay’ (1994) 72 Wash. 
U.L.Q 1031. 
11 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. 775; E. Warren, ‘Bankruptcy 
Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 387. 
12 D. R. Korobkin, “Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law” (1993) 71 
Texas L. Rev. 98. 
13 See, S. Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract (Oxford : OUP, 2007). 
 Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 
of the law rather than according to a static rule based approach. It is a social contract 
theory as it prescribes to protecting the interests of all parties to a dispute fairly drawing 
on extant legal rules and principles of law embedded in the legal system or precedents, 
and it can be applied to insolvencies. 
 
8 Marxist Legal Theory is chosen as it offers normative arguments on the role and impact 
of capitalism on our society through an economic analysis of law. Marx’s arguments on 
capitalism in modern society through the labour theory of value and the continuing and 
widening gap and struggle between the rich in our society (capitalists) and the poor14 
(working class – employees) will be explored. Marxist legal theory will serve as a big 
tool for analysing both the CBT and TPT theories in looking at the contractarian wealth 
maximisation model over the social contract model in creditor interest consideration 
during corporate insolvency.  
 
Marxist Legal Theory 
 
9 Karl Marx saw law as being part of a superstructure which was a reflection of the 
economic base of the society. Law, according to Marx, was used as a means of 
domination of the proletariat (working class or providers of labour) by the bourgeoisie 
(the rich who own and control the means and relations of production in society). To him, 
the history of all society was built on class struggle between the two classes – the owners 
of capital and the providers of labour.15 
 
10 In several of his writings, which mainly centred on criticisms of capitalism, Marx 
gave us what can be termed as the theory of society.16 Through this theory, Marx gives 
an account of how society  works through social ideals, for example, law and morality,  
and social institutions such as education, which can be used to explain what is happening 
in our society today or perhaps why history, as prophesied by him, is unfolding. Marx 
gave various types of societies. These included among others, primitive, feudal, slave 
and capitalist societies through which society evolves. However in this article, regard is 
to be given to the capitalist society. 
 
11 Marx argued that the most important determinant of all aspects of our society is the 
economic situation. This determines or controls the productive system for goods or 
services as compared to other socio – political aspects like education, law and morality 
that are said to be elements that form the superstructure of our society. To Marx, whoever 
                                                 
14 However, it should be noted that, some employees are highly paid than others. Cognisance has to be 
given to the fact that the economic situation at the time of Marx’s writings, ‘Professionals’ were self –
employed. 
15 D. McLellan, Karl Marx: Selected Writings (OUP, Oxford) 615; Z. Husami, ‘Marx on Distributive 
Justice’ in Cohen, Nagel, Scalon, Marx, Justice and History (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1980); 
J. Reiman, ‘Moral Philosophy: The critique of capitalism and the problem of ideology’ in T Carver, The 
Cambridge Companion to Marx (CUP, Cambridge 1991). 
16 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1: The Process of Capital Production 
(Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling trans.) Frederick Engels and Ernest Untermann ed. (Chicago: 
Charles. H Kerr and Co. 1909); A. Oakley, Marx’s Critique of Political Economy: 1884 to 1860 (London: 
Routledge, 1984). 
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controls the economic structure, which is the productive system of a society, is able to 
influence policies or laws that can change, reform or solve issues that are faced within 
that society. 
 
12 Viewed in the context of our current economic society in the UK today, it would be 
unconscionable to deny Marx the praise for foreseeing what is happening today. The UK 
can be categorised as a capitalist society. This is because the current economic structure 
is mainly built on a relationship of two parties: the owners of capital and those that 
provide labour – who are the employees that are employed to offer either physical labour 
or a service based on their skills.  
 
13 However, in a capitalist mode of production, capitalists take wealth maximisation as 
supreme above other social factors, such as the needs and welfare of employees who 
provide the labour that symbiotically17 works alongside capital investment to achieve 
the end product. Moreover, capitalism is based upon the conventional economic theory 
and practice which is premised on the norm that production in society is driven by profit 
which creates and maximises wealth.18 
 
Marxist Theory of Labour Value  
 
14 According to Marx’s “The Labour Theory of Value”, capitalist wealth maximisation 
or giving supremacy to profit making over other social aspects in the production system 
of society constitutes exploitation of workers. Capitalists take as value, the price that 
will be paid for the product on the market against the value of labour that employees put 
into the production of that product.19 It is a known and accepted practice in the world of 
business and investment that profit incentivises capitalists or shareholders to invest 
money in production that in return creates jobs and improves the economic welfare of 
society. It is also worth noting that production of a product or service requires capital as 
well as labour.20 
 
15 Rewarding capitalists or shareholders (who simply put money into production) more 
than employees (who invest labour in the production process) creates social problems 
which adversely affect society at large. When a product that is produced by a 
combination of capital and labour is sold and a profit is made, a shareholder or a capital 
provider, is rewarded with a return on capital investment. Likewise, employees are paid 
                                                 
17 This word derives from the term symbiosis which is used to explain the existence of a mutually 
beneficial relationship between two entities or people. In this chapter, the term is used to highlight the 
existence of two mutual entities: the employer and the employees who both mutually benefit from the 
existence and services of each other especially in the production or service industry. 
18 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1: The Process of Capital Production 
(Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling trans.) Frederick Engels and Ernest Untermann ed. (Chicago: 
Charles. H Kerr and Co. 1909). 
19 R. Miller, Analyzing Marx (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1980). 
20 A. Buchanan, Marx and Justice (Methuen, London 1982). 
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a wage for labour input. However, there is sense in the argument that employees are 
usually paid the lowest possible consideration for their input.21  
 
16 Although shareholders or capital providers usually bear the risk that there would be 
no return on their capital and therefore assume such a risk, they usually do nothing more 
than contributing capital and often receive a proportionately greater return than 
employees. They actually benefit more from the value and wealth created by employees 
than employees themselves. This is because as said above, capitalists consider the profit 
generated by the product or service on the market as the main determinant factor in the 
production process.22 
 
17 To Marx, the value of goods ought to be calculated in consideration of the amount of 
labour that is input, a notion that ought to be managed and controlled by the state’s laws 
and policies. However, this is not possible because in a capitalist society, like the UK 
today, the state is a construct of a few but rich capitalists who control and own the forces 
and relations of production.  They use the law to regulate issues such as property 
ownership and also limit attempts by the employees to claim or press for ownership 
rights.23 
 
18 A vivid example is found in the practice in the working industry for employees to 
have employment contracts with terms and conditions stating what they can and cannot 
do or claim ownership for. Through the contractual approach, employees are more likely 
to have no ownership or say in the final product or service delivery as the final product 
is not their product. They are likened to robots or mercenaries who are hired to do 
specific duties to a certain level, which further highlights the level of inequality of 
bargaining power that exists in the relationship between the employee and the employer. 
 
19 In these employment contracts, the business owners insert terms and clauses that 
entitle the employer to assume ownership of any property such as intellectual property 
that employees create while in the course of their employment.24 This creates and widens 
the level of bargaining inequality between capitalist employers and the working class 
employees and may lead to social effects like alienation of the employees in their 
working places as their main interest is only their salaries and wages, irrespective of the 
level and value of input they invest in the business.25 
 
                                                 
21 J. Reiman, ‘Moral Philosophy: The critique of capitalism and the problem of ideology’ in T Carver, 
The Cambridge Companion to Marx (CUP, Cambridge 1991). 
22Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1: The Process of Capital Production 
(Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling trans.) Frederick Engels and Ernest Untermann ed. (Chicago: 
Charles. H Kerr and Co. 1909)  
23 S. Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1985). 
24 See for example, Patent Act 1977, s.39(1). 
25 See, Z. Husami, ‘Marx on Distributive Justice’ in Cohen, Nagel, Scalon, Marx, Justice and History 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton 1980); J. Reiman, ‘Moral Philosophy: The critique of capitalism 
and the problem of ideology’ in T Carver, The Cambridge Companion to Marx (CUP, Cambridge 1991).  
  NSUBUGA: Corporate Insolvency and Employment Protection  
20 Moreover, this is further exacerbated by the fact that on corporate insolvency, 
employees are accorded a lower creditor status by the current UK insolvency laws in 
comparison to secured creditors such as fixed charge holders. The employees’ main 
mode of protection during corporate insolvency is more concentrated on protecting 
benefits attached to their contract of employment like unpaid wages, accrued holiday, 
maternity and paternity holidays and pension contribution26 by giving those rights 
priority status of consideration than expressly protecting the main employment from 
which such benefits are attached. 
 
21 It should be argued that insolvency law is more concerned with debt collection and 
maximisation of value of returns for creditors.  It does not take as paramount the 
protection of small or unsecured stakeholders, such as employees, as it thinks that this is 
the job of the state. That is why certain insolvency theories such as the CBT27, which is 
pro–capitalist in the form of wealth maximisation, have continued to alienate employees 
from attaining equal treatment and participation in the affairs of their employer company 
during corporate insolvency even though employees play a big role in the economic 
structure of a business.28 
 
22 Although it may be argued that capitalism contributes to economic development in 
our society, it however achieves this at the expense of other social factors like the 
welfare, equal treatment and consideration of other parties’ rights to the production 
process such as those of employees and small trade creditors. Viewed from an analytical 
and economic point of view, it is worth highlighting that most normative insolvency law 
theories prescribe and carry with them, wealth maximisation ideals as a basis for the 
existence of businesses in society. These ideals are further transmitted into the corporate 
rescue processes such society prescribes as a means of solving corporate insolvency 
issues.29 
 
23 The UK administration procedure,  for example, is a ‘practitioner in possession’ 
model30 with high levels of inclusivity of the insolvency practitioner and secured 
creditors who have more powers of influence in the procedure than other parties like 
employees. It does not give primacy to employment protection as the appointed 
administrator’s main objective is to rescue the company as a going concern courtesy of 
paragraph 3(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA 1986”). Although a 
successfully executed administration procedure may lead to preservation of jobs for 
employees, it may be argued, job preservation is not expressly, part of the main three 
hierarchical rescue objectives prescribed in paragraph 3(1). 
 
                                                 
26 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. 6 
27 Discussed below at 1.1.3. 
28 D. Milman, ‘Priority Rights on Corporate Insolvency’ in Alison Clark (ed.) Current Issues in Insolvency 
Law (Stevens, London, 1991) 57. 
29 Ibid., 
30 See V. Finch, ‘Control and Coordination in Corporate Rescue’ (2005) 25(3) Legal Studies 474, 375; G. 
McCormack, ‘Rescuing businesses: designing an “efficient” legal regime’ [2009] JBL 299,330; V. Finch, 
‘Corporate rescue: who is interested?”[2012] JBL 190, 212. 
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The Marxist Normative Call for Value and Equality 
 
24 To remedy this effect, according to a Marxist point of view, the state and its policy 
makers should abandon the capitalists’ notion of taking wealth maximisation for 
creditors as the biggest determinant factor on corporate insolvency. They should take 
social analysis to aspects such as the contributory value of all parties involved in an 
establishment as the basis for passing laws or policies that would serve and protect 
equally the interests of all stakeholders.31 Regard should be based on the questions: 
whose interest does the law, policy or proposal serve most? And how is a balanced 
approach achieved? 
 
25 It should be remembered that not all parties to a contractual agreement possess the 
same bargaining power to press for terms that protect their interests. This highlights the 
need to have insolvency laws and policies that are premised on principles of fairness, 
equality and justice, otherwise such a regime would become the hub for powerful parties 
with better security to exploit the weaker ones;  something which would echo the CBT’s 
wealth maximisation ideal which is not good for employees during corporate insolvency 
as it would favour liquidation of the business where doing so maximises value for the 
creditors.32  
26 From the above argument, a balanced bargaining platform that values contribution, 
not wealth maximisation may be created. In return, a scheme of cooperation between 
parties based on moral equality of value input and fairness would be the solution. All 
stakeholder interests would be allocated equal consideration in insolvency proceedings 
on terms that are reasonable and fairly accepted by all interest holders.33   
 
The Interpretative Theory of Law – Dworkin 
 
27 There have existed many normative theories on various theoretical perspectives. 
However, in the field of legal theory and jurisprudence, there have existed mainly two 
dominant schools of thought. These are the natural law theorists and the legal positivists. 
The difference in these approaches is best illustrated by the famous debate between 
Fuller (on the natural law side) and Hart (on the positivist legal side).34 It is worth noting 
that, since this debate, most legal theorists have continued to identify their theories as 
either being on the natural law side or the positivist legal side of this theoretical divide. 
 
                                                 
31 A. Buchanan, Marx and Justice (Methuen, London 1982). 
32 L. Ponoroff, ‘Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model 
for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings’ (1994) 23 Capital University Law Review 441; Rizwaan J. Mokal, 
‘The authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain and Corporate Liquidation’ (2001) 
21 Legal Studies 400, 414.  
33 For a similar discourse on this point, see, Rizwaan J. Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and 
Application (OUP, Oxford 2005), Chapter 3. 
34Regrettably, this debate is not discussed in this article, as it is outside its intended normative justification.  
However, see,  H.L.A Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 
(1958); L. Fuller, “Positivism and the Fidelity of Law – A Response to Professor Hart” 71 Harv. L. Rev. 
630, (1958). 
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28 There are mainly two particular versions of legal positivist ideals that natural law 
theorists argue against that have greatly contributed to this theoretical divide. Legal 
positivists see law as entirely comprising of rules. To them, law is the law as posited. 
Secondly, legal positivists, believe in the concept of judicial discretion. That is, during 
the course of their adjudication, if faced with legal questions (sometimes referred to as 
hard cases thesis) that cannot be decided on existing laws and precedents, judges must 
be able to draw on their discretion to fill the gap.  
 
29 Among the most famous critics of these legal positivist ideals, is Professor Ronald 
Dworkin through his Interpretative Theory of Law.35 Through this theory, Dworkin is 
seen as creating a sophisticated theory of law that can be termed as an alternative to legal 
positivism and natural law theories. However, it should be noted that occasionally, 
Dworkin has referred to his theory as a natural law theory. Moreover, viewed from the 
lens of the famous Fuller - Hart debate, Dworkin’s theory seems to be on the natural law 
side of the theoretical divide. 
 
30 Throughout this theory, Dworkin bases his arguments on three main ideals, which if 
analysed, support his interpretative approach to law as they offer normative justification 
for his critique of the legal positivists’ ideals above on how law ought to be seen and 
interpreted in a given legal system or society. These ideals comprise of the “right 
answer” thesis (that centres upon his dissent to judicial discretion and his model Judge 
Hercules), law as integrity and Constructive interpretation (law as principles and rules).36 
 
31 Through the constructive interpretative approach, Dworkin offers an approach to 
solving legal disputes in society through constructive interpretation.  He opines that;  
 
“every time a judge is confronted with a legal problem, that judge 
should construct a theory of what the law is, that is, a theory that must 
adequately fit the past relevant governmental actions such as policy 
underlying the passing of that law to make the law the best it can be.”37  
 
According to Dworkin, law as practice and law as legal theory are best understood as 
processes of interpretation. Therefore, the judge must interpret the law in a manner that 
fits the legal context at hand because constructiveness in interpretation is the proper 
approach to artistic and literal interpretation as it coheres with the need to make the law 
the best it can be, carrying with it, the principles of moral value.  
 
32 Where constructiveness and integrity are applied in the interpretation of laws, policies 
and practices, it makes the laws of that society more like a product of a single moral 
vision. After all, a judge who accepts the interpretative ideal of integrity, decides cases 
                                                 
35 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1977); R. Dworkin, Laws Empire 
(Cambridge, MA: HUP,1986). 
36 R . Dworkin, Laws Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), pp 46 – 48; R. Dworkin, “Pragmatism, Right 
Answers and True Benality” in Pragmatism in Law and Society (M. Brint and W. Weaver ed., Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colo., 1991) at 365. 
37 See R. Dworkin, Laws Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), p.52. 
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by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles, about peoples’ rights and duties 
drawing on the political and legal doctrines embedded in that community or field, to find 
a unique “right answer” to the legal question before him, rather than using his discretion 
to fill the gap – a legal positivist notion that Dworkin greatly dis-contends with.38 
 
33 Through his right answer thesis,39 Dworkin claims that all or almost all legal 
questions have a unique right answer, even the hardest of cases. To achieve that unique 
right answer, Dworkin devises the idea of a model judge in Hercules who is seen as super 
judge that can have an answer to every legal question brought to him.40 
 
34 However, the idea of Hercules has been seen as one of the most controversial 
propositions by Dworkin in his writings on legal theory and has therefore attracted 
criticism.41 Among the criticisms is the question as to whether such a judge may ever 
exist in reality and execute the duties put before him diligently as Dworkin posits. 
Criticisms put aside, the idea of Judge Hercules may be useful in the quest for novel 
interpretation of laws and policies in our society especially where there are no existing 
legal precedents from which a judge and other legal practitioners may seek guidance and 
direction.   
 
Application of Dworkin’s Interpretative Theory to Insolvency 
 
35 It should be remembered that theories provide evaluative and analytical tools for 
examining legal arguments and highlighting implications that arise from such 
arguments. Dworkin’s approach to interpretation would play a big role in informing and 
highlighting the need for policy justification in dealing with contentious issues on 
corporate insolvency.  
 
36 For instance, it may be argued that the failure to reach a consensus on the legitimate 
goal of insolvency law creates a legal dilemma (which is interpretative in nature) that is 
an analogy to Dworkin’s “hard case thesis”.42 The lack of consensus means that a judge 
faced with a task of interpreting insolvency law policies, statutes or provisions must find 
a right answer that does not cause absurdity to either party but commands the moral 
justification required of it. 
 
37 It may be argued that in the UK, particularly, in the field of insolvency law, there 
have not been specific hard cases that are analogous to Dworkin’s hard case thesis that 
would warrant the application of the Hercules theory. This is because in the UK, as 
opposed to other jurisdictions like the US where there is a level of skill set for bankruptcy 
judges to consider, judges in the UK insolvency proceedings, do not have to ask 
                                                 
38 See, R. Dworkin, Laws Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986), p.255. 
39 R. Dworkin, “Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Benality” in Pragmatism in Law and Society (M. 
Brint and W. Weaver ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1991) at 365. 
40 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: G. Duckworth, 1977) page 85. 
41 See for instance, H.L.A Hart, “PostCript”, in The Concept of Law (2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1994) at 248, 249. 
42 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: G. Duckworth, 1977) page 85. 
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themselves, whether, a company faced with financial difficulties, can or should be 
rescued. The UK judges do not consider economic and business decisions as part of their 
role in adjudication. They are willing to leave these matters to experts in these particular 
fields such as insolvency practitioners and business experts.43  
38 Moreover, Dworkin’s hard case theory is more judge focused and UK insolvency law 
is more insolvency practitioner focused and therefore, there is a high level of contrast. 
However, what can be drawn from Dworkin’s Hercules and hard case theses, is the 
ability to analyse the administrator’s role and capacity to discharge his duties in a manner 
that is analogous to that of a judge. This is supported by the fact that Schedule B1 to the 
IA 1986 which deals with administration proceedings, is about how the administrator 
thinks. The level of expectation from an administrator (especially in deciding which 
rescue objective would serves the interests of creditors as a whole) during insolvency 
proceedings, is analogous to that of Hercules presiding over a hard case as posited by 
Dworkin. 
39 The administration procedure is largely controlled and driven by the administrator as 
he is afforded significant powers to exercise his discretion.44 Upon appointment, the 
administrator is tasked to perform his duties in the interest of all creditors of the company 
as a whole.45 Among the hierarchy of objectives to be pursued, the main objective is to 
rescue the company as a going concern.46 However, it should be noted that, while 
rescuing the company as a going concern is the main objective to be pursued by the 
administrator, this objective may not be pursued by the administrator where he thinks 
that such an objective cannot be reasonably and practically achieved, or where he thinks 
that doing so would not serve or achieve the best interest for creditors as a whole.47 It 
may be submitted that this amounts to a high level of decision making power afforded 
to the administrator, which analogously places him within the ambit of  judge Hercules 
as posited by Dworkin. 
40 Moreover, the administrator, being the person in charge of rescue proceeding, it may 
be argued, is well positioned to judge as to whether a particular objective, if pursued, 
would be successful and in the interest of all stakeholders. This may be partly, based on 
his level of expertise in that particular field and his professional judgement. What this 
implies is that, the threshold or test applicable in this situation is what the administrator 
thinks as opposed to what he reasonably believes.48     
41 With such decision making powers and high level of expectation, if an administrator 
decides for example, that disposing of business assets or laying off some employees 
                                                 
43 See the House of Lords debate to this effect;  Hansard, HL Deb, vol. 638, col.768 (29 July 2002). 
44 See, particularly, IA 1986, Sch. B1. 
45 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para.3(2). 
46 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Para. 3(1)(a). 
47 G. McCormack, “Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo –American Evaluation” (2007) Int’l & 
Comp. L. Quarterly  56(3), 515 – 551.  
48 R. Mokal and J. Armour, “The New UK Rescue Procedure – The Administrator’s Duty to Act 
Rationally” (2004) 1 International Corporate Rescue 136. 
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would achieve a better outcome for company creditors as a whole, or preserve the going 
concern value of the business, such a decision will stand. Although some scope exists 
for aggrieved creditors to challenge an administrator’s judgment49 and sometimes such 
challenges are upheld by courts,50 it should be noted that an administrator’s judgment 
formed in good faith, may be very difficult to challenge, due to the level of regard 
accorded him by the law and judges.51 
42 The need for constructiveness and integrity in interpretation of hard cases on the part 
of the administrator may be illustrated by the Court of Appeal decision in Re 
Huddersfield Fine Worsteds Ltd and Re Ferrotech Ltd & Granville Technology Ltd.52 In 
that case, the Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether, liabilities for protective 
awards and payments in lieu of notice, to employees of a company in administration, 
whose contracts of employment have been adopted by the administrator, would be 
interpreted within the scope of “wages or salary” pursuant to paragraph 99(4)–(6) of 
Schedule B1 to the IA 1986.  
43 Another practical importance of this case was that, the Court of Appeal had to hear 
this case at short notice as the following day (10th August 2005) the 14 day period since 
one of the companies involved in this litigation (Granville Technology Ltd) had entered 
into administration, was due to expire. This had the effect that the administrators of this 
company had to decide whether or not to adopt the contracts of employment of over 150 
employees, depending on the outcome of the case. 
44 Although this may not be categorised as a hard case per se, it may be argued, that the 
level of technicalities encountered in interpreting legal and policy provisions around 
paragraph 99 above, draws it closer to what Dworkin would term as a hard case upon 
which an administrator’s and a judge’s ability to adopt a novel interpretative approach 
to finding a fair and balanced answer may be drawn. 
45 A protective award arises under s.189 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (the “1992 Act”), where by virtue of s.188 of the 1992 Act, an 
employer has failed on the obligation to hold consultations with employees in a case 
where more than 19 employees are to be dismissed by reason of redundancy unless there 
are special circumstances that render such consultations not reasonably practicable.53 A 
payment in lieu of notice arises where, either with express or implied agreement,  an  
employer either gives proper notice of termination of employment to the employee or 
the employer summarily dismisses the employee and tenders a payment in lieu of proper 
notice as such action would amount to a breach of contract of employment.54 
                                                 
49 IA 1986, Sch. B1, Paras.74 and 88. 
50 See for example, Clydesdale Financial Services v Smailes [2009] EWHC 1745 (Ch.) 
51 V. Finch, ‘Re-Invigorating Corporate Rescue’ [2003] J.B.L 527, 546.  
52 [2005] EWCA Civ. 1072. 
53 See the reasoning in Re Hartlebury Printers Ltd [1993]BCLC 902. 
54 See the four principal categories of payments in lieu of notice as set out by Lord Browne – Wilkinson 
in Delaney v Staples [1992] 1 AC 687, at 692D – H. 
  NSUBUGA: Corporate Insolvency and Employment Protection  
46 In Re Huddersfield55, Peter Smith J had given judgment on 27 July 2005 that 
protective awards and payments in lieu of notice were paid in priority to administration 
expenses. However, on 9 August 2005, Etherton J, gave a judgment that both protective 
awards and payments in lieu of notice were not payable in priority to administration 
expenses in respect of two different companies in the Re Ferrotech Ltd and Granville 
Technology case.56 These two conflicting first instance decisions led to this appeal.  
47 By virtue of paragraphs 99(5) and 99(4), priority status applies to liabilities arising 
under a contract of employment which was adopted by the former administrator or 
predecessor. However,  paragraph 99(5)(c) states that no account is taken of a liability 
to make a payment other than for wages and salaries. Under paragraph 99(6), wages and 
salaries include among other things, holiday pay and sick pay. However, the challenge 
in interpretation mainly centred on the interpretation of paragraph 99(6)(d) and 
paragraph 99(5)(c).  Paragraph 99(6)(d) states: 
“in respect of a period, a sum which would be treated as earnings for 
that period for the purposes of an enactment about social security.”  
48 Interestingly, the Court of Appeal had to listen to four versions of interpreting this 
sub paragraph from each of the legal teams and the Attorney General during this case. 
However, more interesting, is the fact the Court of Appeal was not prepared to accept 
the submission of the Attorney General that the problem of interpretation before the 
court was as the result of a drafting error. 
 49 Secondly, the test to ascertain whether protective awards or payments in lieu of 
notice are payable in priority to administration expenses, centred on two conditions 
being satisfied in paragraph 99(5): 
 That the liability arose out of a contract of employment. 
 That the liability fell within the category of ‘wages and salaries.’ 
 
In the judgment (delivered by Lord Neuberger), the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal 
of the administrators against the decision of Peter Smith J in Re Huddersfield, holding 
that protective awards and payments in lieu of notice were not payable in priority to 
administration expenses and upholding the decision of Etherton J in the Re Ferrotech 
Ltd and Granville Technology case. 
50 The judges opined that analysing both issues involved establishing a gateway and if 
the gateway was correct, protective awards would not enjoy super-priority because they 
could not be described as liabilities arising under a contract of employment, but  were 
liabilities that no doubt arose because of the existence of a contract of employment.57 
Notably, the judges opined that: 
                                                 
55 [2005] EWCA Civ. 1682 (ch). 
56[2005] EWCA Civ. 1072.  
57 See paragraph 17 of the judgment. 
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“.. ..the argument involved giving the  words “arising under” in 
paragraph 99(5), their ordinary and natural meaning, the notion that 
such expression should not be given an artificially wide meaning…”58 
Therefore, it may be argued that benefits and interests such as wages, salaries  protective 
awards and so forth, are given recognition by the existence of a contract of employment. 
There is sense in the argument that policy considerations (especially, of the need to 
promote the rescue culture during corporate insolvencies) were pivotal in overruling 
Peter Smith  J’s judgment in Re Huddersfield. There is even more sense in the argument 
that, allowing protective awards and payments in lieu of notice to be paid in priority over 
administration expenses would make adoption of employment contracts by 
administrators substantially costly and burdensome to rescue attempts. However, the 
judgment in Re Huddersfield would be favourable to employees.   
51 This case highlighted the extent to which the courts may be prepared to analyse what 
the legislature intended in passing this legislation. This is the interpretative approach, 
that carries with it the integrity and novelty in exploring extant legal rules and principles 
to derive at a unique right answer that Dworkin posits, in the manner of Hercules and 
which by extension, an administrator should arguably adopt. 
52 Similarly, the case of DKKL Solicitors v H M Revenue & Customs59 further highlights 
the level of expertise and impartiality expected of administrators in their administration 
of insolvent but viable businesses. The decision further gives clear indication that judges 
still vest great reliance on the expertise and perhaps impartiality of administrators.60 
53 In this case, an insolvent law firm of solicitors trading as a limited liability partnership 
made an application for an administration order for the financially struggling law firm, 
to be sold as a pre-packaged business to  a newly incorporated limited liability 
partnership – Drummond Kirkwood LLP. The law firm was deeply in debt, totalling 
over £2 million pounds, and the largest creditor, HM Revenue and Customs was owed 
in excess of £1.7 million pounds. HM Revenue and Customs objected to the application 
for the administration order and instead, filed a petition for a winding up order against 
the law firm. As the majority creditor, H M Revenue and Customs were convinced that 
they would defeat the administrators’ proposals if put before a creditors’ meeting. 
However, the creditors’ meeting was not convened due to the fact that the proposals in 
the application for the administration order were for the sale of the partnership business 
as a pre-pack. 
54 Due to the nature of debt faced by the partnership business, the possibility of rescuing 
the partnership as a going concern would be practically impossible, therefore, the most 
viable objective was for the administrators to pursue the second objective of 
administration in paragraph 3(1)(b) of schedule B1 to the IA 1986. The court, in 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 
59 [2007] BCC 908 (Ch). 
60 Bo Xie, ‘Protecting the Interest of General Unsecured Creditors in Pre-packs: The Implication and 
Implementation of SIP 16’ (2010) 31(6) Company Lawyer, 189 -195. 
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considering whether or not this objective, as indicated in the statement of affairs 
presented by the proposed administrators, would be achievable, placed great reliance on 
the expertise and experience of the proposed administrators in granting the 
administration order. 
55 Although it may be argued that the court, in considering its decision, was again 
influenced by policy considerations of saving the jobs of fifty employees, this is the 
decision that further highlights the over-reliance of judges on the professional expertise 
of administrators. Moreover, even if major creditors (H M Revenue & Customs) were to 
veto the administrators’ proposals in creditors’ meeting, the court may still ratify those 
proposals under paragraph 55(2) of Schedule B1 to the IA 1986. 
56 Therefore, to Dworkin, through his right answer thesis, the administrator, due to the 
level of impartiality and expertise expected of him in exploring the available legal rules 
and principles embedded in the legal system, should be able to find the right answer, 
approach  or objective to adopt in pursuing the rescue operations of the company. This 
may be done, especially, where such an administrator constructs a theory of what the 
law is, a theory that adequately fits the past relevant governmental action, such as a 
policy underlying the passing of the such laws, in this case, the IA 1986, without using 
his discretion to fill the gap, which may turn up to be detrimental to the interest of other 
stakeholders in the insolvent company. 
57 To Dworkin, a theory that is built on the principles of fairness, equality and justice, 
can set moral standards or obligations that would be meaningfully tested in pursuing 
stakeholder interests during corporate insolvency. In return, the standard of morality or 
moral obligation expected of parties in dealing with each other in contractual 
arrangements would be justified. If, for instance, one stakeholder selfishly sets out to 
maximise his interest against the interests of other stakeholders, his intentions or reasons 
for doing so must be publicly tested and justified as being for fair and just intentions, not 
against the interests of others per se.  
 
The Creditors’ Bargain Theory  
 
58 The CBT was developed by Jackson in the early 1980s61 and partly in collaborative 
writings with Baird62 and Scott.63 The CBT is a contractarian theory in nature as it carries 
with it, some theoretical underpinnings of the Law and Economics movement.64 It is 
                                                 
61 Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1982) 91 
Yale Law Journal 857, 860; Thomas H Jackson, ‘Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 36 Stan. L. 
Rev. 725; Thomas H. Jackson, ‘The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (HUP, Cambridge, MA 1986). 
62 D. Baird & T. H. Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chicago 
L. Rev. 97. 
63 T. H. Jackson & R. Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the 
Creditors’ Bargain (1989) 75 Virginia L. Rev. 155. 
64 This is based on the “round table” discussions by leading scholars in the law and economics field 
including Richard A Posner, Ronald Coarse, Thomas Jackson, Douglas Baird among others. See, D G 
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premised on the notion of wealth maximisation, an ideology that insolvency law exists 
to maximise the collective interests or value for creditors on corporate insolvency.   
 
59 The theory is based on a hypothesis that creditors bargain with the debtor company 
during negotiations for credit and establish their position and remedies upon default by 
the company, such as on insolvency. Therefore, to the jurisprudence of the CBT, when 
a company goes into formal insolvency, several creditors with interests in it will try to 
recover their debt from the company. There will be a race against time for each creditor 
to recover their debt.  
 
60 Because of the panic from these creditors, the assets of the company may be 
impounded or attached by creditors on a self–help “first come first served basis.” 
However, this approach is usually dominated by selfish interests, especially from strong 
and secured creditors or those with preferential status that either arises out of statute, or 
is granted through pre-insolvency private contractual agreements.65 However, not all 
creditors may be able to recover their debts on a self–help approach, as different creditors 
may have different enforcement rights against the debtor company, depending on their 
pre-insolvency contractual agreements.  
 
61 Secured creditors, such as banks or qualifying floating charge holders, may have more 
enforcement rights against the debtor company than general unsecured creditors. The 
race by these creditors to pursue individual claims or interests against the debtor 
company creates other problems, such as costly litigation expenses. Moreover, other 
stakeholders may gain advantage unfairly, through having better information or stronger 
enforcement tactics, which may present more of a problem than the presence of secured 
creditors, who would be paid first anyway.  
 
62 All of these shortcomings may cause depreciation in value to business assets which 
creates uncertainty of returns to all creditors and may turn out to be administratively 
inefficient.66 To the CBT, the solution to these problems is to replace the individual 
enforcement approach with a collective regime which will enable all creditors to take 
part in a collective debt recovery scheme,67 in accordance with pre-existing priorities. 
 
63 The debtor’s business assets may be regarded as a pool of assets from which debts 
will be satisfied. The CBT claims that a collective and regulated formal scheme of asset 
distribution to creditors, rather than piecemeal liquidation of company assets, would 
                                                 
Baird, “The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward” 64, University of Chicago Law Review 
1129. 
65 Douglas G. Baird, ‘A World Without Bankruptcy’ (1987) 50 Law & Contemp. Probs. 173; B. E. Adler, 
‘A World Without Debt’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L. Q 811 – 827. 
66 D. Baird & T. H. Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chicago 
L. Rev. 97. 
67 M. Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The Theory of Groups (HUP, 1971) 2. 
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preserve the company’s net asset value.68 Viewed from the lens of business rescue and 
employment protection, formal asset disposal would be less costly and would enhance 
the going concern value of the business which, if successfully bought by a new owner, 
would save jobs for the employees. 
 
64 However, it should be noted that collectivity in asset distribution may require the 
application of the insolvency law principle of redistribution, a move that the CBT is 
strongly opposed to. Redistribution involves the alteration of pre-insolvency 
entitlements, or the transfer of an interest from one creditor to another, to honour that 
creditor’s interest on corporate insolvency.69  
 
65 The CBT and its proponents see this as a move that is unfair if the wealth of another 
creditor, who assumed the risk to invest in the debtor company, is altered or reduced to 
honour the claims of another creditor who would otherwise not be entitled to a 
redistributive interest. This is because the CBT and its proponents perceive insolvency 
as a foreseeable risk that can be assumed individually in a given business transaction. 
 
66 Under the CBT, insolvency should be seen as any other financial risk that a creditor 
assumes by choosing to invest in the business. Therefore, the CBT does not support 
redistribution in insolvency. This theory supports the view that insolvency law should 
consider all the debtor company’s pre-insolvency held interests as it finds them.70 
However, the counter argument to this point of view is that, although some pre-
insolvency interests are negotiated and agreed in private contractual agreements, other 
interests arise out of statute for example; the claims of tort victims and government tax 
authorities who are unable to diversify risks or equity.71 Where this is the case, courts of 
law or equity may be obliged to modify or make alterations to pre-insolvency contractual 
arrangements where it is just and equitable to do so.72  
 
The CBT on Employment Protection 
 
67 In any production or service industry, employees are closely involved with the 
operations of the company business. They play a big role in the means of production or 
service delivery compared to other interest holders like trade suppliers. Without 
employees, the production process may be severely disrupted as employees with 
equivalent skills or knowhow may not easily be sourced elsewhere and replaced at short 
                                                 
68 Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1982) 91 
Yale Law Journal 857, 860; Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 36 Stan. L. 
Rev. 725; Thomas H. Jackson, ‘The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (HUP, Cambridge, MA 1986). 
69 J. Armour, ‘Should We Redistribute in Insolvency?’ (2006) Centre for Business Research, University 
of Cambridge Working Paper No. 319 (accessed online at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP319.pdf) 
(last accessed October 2015). 
70 Y. Rotem, ‘Pursuing Preservation of Pre-Bankruptcy Entitlements: Corporate Bankruptcy and Law’s 
Self Executing Mechanisms’ (2008) 5 (1) Berkley Business Law Journal, 79, 90. 
71 David G. Carlson, ‘Rationality, Accident and Priority under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code’ 
(1986) 71 Minn. L. Rev.207. 
72 M. Bruckner, ‘The Virtue in Bankruptcy’ (2013) 45 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 233, 234 
– 35. 
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notice, where as other interest holders, such as trade suppliers may often be easily 
changed with minimal disruption to production or service delivery.73 Their contribution 
to the business deserves fair recognition. Employees should not merely be classed as 
ordinary creditors on corporate insolvency since without their input in the production 
process or service delivery, the end product may not be achieved. This is one of the 
objectives that legislators and policy makers should seek to balance during stakeholder 
interest consideration during corporate insolvency.74 
 
68 The CBT advocates a collective approach, rather than a self–help approach as the 
best mechanism in pursuing interests amongst creditors during the insolvency of the 
debtor company. Viewed from the context of the UK insolvency laws and corporate 
rescue processes such as administration, it may be submitted that the administration 
procedure is in line with this normative argument based on the CBT. It is the argument 
that during the insolvent state of the company, creditor primacy prevails against other 
interests. This is also evident in the legislative provisions of the IA 1986 setting out the 
hierarchy of objectives to be pursued by the administrator.75 It is arguable that all three 
hierarchical objectives, carry with them the ultimate objective of recovering the interests 
of the aggrieved stakeholders.  
 
69 However, collectivity in pursuing stakeholders’ interests, as advocated for by the 
CBT, does not enhance employee protection during insolvency proceedings as 
employees are not given a special class in recognition of their special status. Moreover, 
current UK insolvency law and corporate rescue processes such as administration and 
company voluntary arrangements as well as administrative receivership still recognise 
employees as general unsecured creditors. It is the notion that for collectivity to be fully 
embraced, employees as the providers of labour, should arguably be viewed on the same 
platform as capital providers, after all, a combination of capital and labour are the two 
main factors of production or service delivery in any given market economy.76    
 
70 In addition to the above, the CBT is premised on a hypothetical contract. Creditors 
are the parties to this hypothetical contract which is agreed under a veil of ignorance.77 
Although the bargain under the CBT is reached without regard to self-interest and 
therefore, objectively justifiable, there exists a lack of actual consent from parties to 
agree to contractual terms or conditions that would form a collective approach to 
pursuing collective over selfish interests. Therefore, the CBT’s argument for a collective 
and mandatory regime may be seen as being coercive to the stakeholders with legal 
                                                 
73 Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy Systems (Yale Univ. Press, New 
Haven 1997) 19. 
74 L. Ponoroff, ‘Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model 
for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings’ (1994) 23 Capital University Law Review 441. 
75 See, IA 1986, Sch. B1, Paragraph 3(1).  
76 See K. Marx, ‘Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1:The Process of Capitalist Production 
(Samual Moore and Edward Avelling trans.) F. Engles and E. Untermann ed. (Chicago: C H Kerr & Co, 
1990) Ch. 1; D. Milman, “Priority Rights on Corporate Insolvency” in Alison Clark (ed.), Current Issues 
in Insolvency Law (London: Stevens, 1991), P.57. 
77 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
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interests against the debtor company.  For collectivity to be fully observed in this respect, 
there would be a need to give all stakeholders a voice or participation right in the 
decision-making process to enforce their interests.78 For employees, it is envisaged that 
collectiveness would give them a chance to be involved in the actual rescue decisions or 
processes of their insolvent employer but in reality, CBT does not extend this to 
employees. 
 
71 Viewing the UK administration rescue procedure under the lens of the CBT approach, 
the procedure may be regarded as a collective and inclusive recue process. It requires 
the administrator to serve the interests of all company creditors as a whole79 but in reality 
secured creditors often benefit more from this provision than employees due to different 
levels of security held over the other. Interesting to note, is the fact that the CBT limits 
stakeholder participation in pursuing interests to only those with legal rights against the 
debtor company’s assets. Stakeholders without express contractual entitlements but who 
mainly rely on implied rights or goodwill only have their rights or interest considered 
where they would add value and maximise the going concern value of overall returns to 
creditors. This makes the CBT a narrow theory in its approach to stakeholder interest 
consideration. Therefore, insolvency laws and policies modelled on the jurisprudence of 
the CBT would not recognise the special status of employees and so they would be less 
protective of employees.  
 
The Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganizations (TPT) 
 
72 TPT was developed by Professor Lynn LoPucki.80 The theory owes its origin to the 
team production theory of corporate law which was developed from the economics 
literature on team production and corporate governance.81 It was based on the ideology 
that the main purpose or economic goal of the firm is to maximise shareholder interests.82  
 
73 This is the ideology that LoPucki moves away from and develops into a theory to 
analyse bankruptcy reorganizations on the ideology that shareholders are not the only 
                                                 
78 M. Frank, ‘The Rights of Employees in the event of their Employer’s Insolvency: A Comparative 
Approach to the Rights of Employees During Restructuring in the United States and Europe’ (2005) 1 
New Zealand Postgraduate Law E-Journal 7. 
79 IA 1986, Sch.B1, para.3(2). 
80 Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganizations’ (2003) UCLA Law 
School Research Paper No. 3 -12. (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=397801). (Last accessed on 5 
December 2015). 
81A. A. Alchian and H Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations (1972), Am 
Econ. Rev.777; M M Blair and Lyn A Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’(1999) 85 
Virginia L. Rev. 247. 
82 D. Millon, ‘New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law’ (1993) 50 Washington & Lee L. Rev. 1373; L Fairfax, ‘The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: 
The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms’ (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 675, 
676; G Crespi, ‘Maximizing the wealth of Fictional Shareholders: Which Fiction Should Directors 
Embrace’ (2007) 32 Journal of Corporation Law, 383, 386. 
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party that contributes to the production process of a firm but other parties, such as trade 
suppliers and employees, all provide combined input to get the end product.83  
 
74 TPT is built on the ideology that a production firm is a combination of team members 
who join resources together in a production process to achieve an end product. Under 
the TPT, without joining resources, a single party or unit cannot produce the end product 
on its own. Therefore, the end product belongs to all parties to the production process.84 
Because of this, the TPT supports the view that all parties to the production process 
should be able to embrace insolvency as a contractual term voluntarily, as it affects all 
as a team in a production unit. Their interests on corporate insolvency should be 
considered as part of a group, not as one stakeholder with priority status over the other. 
 
75 Under the TPT, it is through mutual trust that all team members vest their legitimate 
interests in the board of directors of the company to decide how best to promote the 
fortunes of the company business. TPT is premised on actual contracts negotiated and 
entered into by all team members, a move away from the hypothetical contract model 
that the CBT is based on. Through this, reorganisations of the company business may be 
achieved through collective team agreements where this benefits team members as a 
group, in contrast to liquidation of company assets to the primary benefit of some 
secured creditors. Viewed from this context, collective restructurings, such as the closure 
of underperforming sections or units of the firm may be supported where it would benefit 
team members as a group and enhance the going concern value of the business.85 
 
76 TPT is a theory that promotes inclusivity of all team members during insolvency 
proceedings. It supports the view that, apart from actual or physical contributions made 
by team members in a production unit, other non-physical contributions based on 
experience or job specific skills contribute to the enhancement of the going concern 
value of the company. Where liquidation of company assets is inevitable and accepted 
by all team members, TPT would support redistribution of some of the interest of one 
team member to another, as a means of fulfilling its obligation to its team members in 
contrast to the non-redistributive ideology that the CBT supports.  
 
77 The TPT being an inclusive theory, advocates honouring all team members’ interests 
on the insolvency of the company, whether in terms of financial gain or losses.86 
Therefore, as much as team members would benefit from the financial distributional gain 
in insolvency, losses should also be distributed amongst all team members, even if it 
                                                 
83 Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganizations’ (2003) UCLA Law 
School Research Paper No. 3 -12. (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=397801). (Last accessed on 5 
December 2015); M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance For The Twenty 
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84 A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations’ (1972), 
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would involve alterations to pre-insolvency entitlements from one member to another. 
Redistribution under the TPT, is a form of honouring the commitments made between 
the company and the team members, basing on pre-insolvency obligations. 
 
Employees under TPT  Employment Protection 
 
78 The TPT is a theory that supports consideration of interests of all team members on 
the insolvency of the company. The theory supports the view that equal weight of 
consideration be given to all team members’ interests without giving more weight to 
certain class team members, such as secured ones over others. Therefore, corporate 
insolvency policies built on this ideology would benefit employees more, as their 
interests on the insolvency of their employer company would be given equal weight of 
consideration, like those of other stakeholders.87  
 
79 Moreover, their non-contractual rights, interests and expectations, such as the 
continuity of employment from the employees’ point of view would be considered as 
relevant and deserving of protecting in an insolvency regime modelled on the normative 
principles of the TPT. This is supported by the argument that the TPT theory is built on 
the notion of maximising the welfare of all interest holders as a team, as each team 
member’s input in the production or service delivery unit is considered relevant to 
achieving the end product or goal. 
 
80 Due to the collective nature of the TPT, it is assumed that collective decision making 
on issues or policies that would enhance the going concern value of the company would 
be reached easily. Because there would be no panic among team members to race against 
time to extract selfish and readily realisable interests from the assets of the company, 
unnecessary liquidation of company assets on a piecemeal basis would be avoided. This 
would give the company a chance to continue trading out of its financial difficulties, 
rehabilitated and perhaps sold as a going concern. This would be beneficial to 
employees, as some jobs may be saved and the chain of continuity of employment may 
be preserved. 
 
81 In addition to the above, corporate insolvency policies built on the principles of the 
TPT theory would support going concern sales of insolvent but viable businesses, such 
as those under the current UK employment law protective provision in the Transfer of 
Undertakings Protection of Employment Regulations 2006 (“TUPE”).  A going concern 
business sale or transfer would preserve the continuity of employment through automatic 
transfer provisions under regulation 4 of TUPE and the prohibition on terminating 
employment contracts without just cause by employers, merely to make insolvent 
business sales attractive, in regulation 7 of TUPE. These provisions would be supported 
by a TPT generated insolvency law regime. 
 
 
                                                 
87 Bruce G. Carruthers & Terrence C. Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Bankruptcy Law in 
England and the United States (OUP, Oxford 1998) 303. 
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Conclusion 
 
82 In conclusion, it is worth noting that the application of laws and policies modelled on 
the normative conception of pure insolvency–specific theories has so far failed to 
achieve a balanced platform for dealing with stakeholder interests on corporate 
insolvency. A consensus on the central question of insolvency law, that is, whose main 
interest should insolvency laws and policies give priority on corporate insolvency, is yet 
to be achieved. This may partly be borne in the argument that insolvency law is more 
focused on creditors getting their money back in a procedural way. It does not largely, 
carry with it social aspects such as protecting employees or the environment. 
 
83 Drawing on the normative arguments discussed above, it may be argued that the 
application of Marxist legal theory that advocates for a balanced labour–value approach 
and Dworkin’s interpretative approach to interpreting legal rules, policies and principles 
in a manner that carries with it ideals such as justice and fairness, may help balance the 
bargaining platform.  
 
84 It should be remembered that competing policy goals of rescuing insolvent but viable 
businesses and those of protecting and promoting employment are not totally 
incompatible. Where business rescue is pursued successfully, it saves jobs and promotes 
continuity of employment. However, the problem arises where the objective of rescuing 
businesses conflicts with the objective of protecting employment. This is because both 
objectives are difficult to achieve simultaneously; rather a compromise must be made.  
But this would be achievable through an interpretative approach to laws and policies that 
accords, to all stakeholders, a seat on the bargaining table. 
 
85 Such a contentious issue as redistribution in insolvency would require a novel 
interpretative approach if equal regard to all stakeholder interests is to be achieved fairly. 
It would require the application of the principles of “moral value” and “fit” criteria as 
posited by Dworkin’s interpretative approach to law, as it is a practice that the CBT and 
its proponents are so opposed to. CBT theorists view redistribution as an act of theft 
from one creditor to make the other happy in that, altering their entitlement to 
redistribute to another creditor would be seen as rendering their pre-insolvency 
entitlements ineffective.88 
 
86 Although some claims and entitlements arise out of contractual arrangements, some 
arise out of statute.89 For example, as mentioned above, involuntary creditors such as 
tort victims and tax authorities who never chose to be in the position they find themselves 
in, would require protection. Therefore, although some contractual arrangement may 
entitle certain class creditors, such as secured creditors or holders of qualifying floating 
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Law’s Self Executing Mechanisms’ (2008) 5(1) Berkeley Business Law Journal 79, 90. 
89 R. J. Mann, ‘Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money is it anyway’ (1995) 
70 (5) New york University Law Review 1040; Y Rotem, Pursuing Preservation of Pre-Bankruptcy 
Entitlements: Corporate Bankruptcy and Law’s Self Executing Mechanisms’ (2008) 5 (1) Berkeley 
Business Law Journal 79, 84. 
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charges, to certain levels of protection and entitlement during insolvency, pursing these 
claims and entitlements may be unconscionable or unjust to the rights and entitlements 
of other class creditors, who also offer other forms of contribution to the company 
business that enhance its going concern value. Following Dworkin, the “moral value” 
and the “fit” criteria of interpretation would play a big role in evenly recognising the 
contribution of various parties to the company business,90 a move that both Marxist legal 
theory and TPT would happily support. 
 
87 In light of the current rescue processes such as administration and pre-pack business 
sales in the UK, both Dworkin and Marxist ideals would help to inform and influence 
the need for law and policy makers to address contentious issues being raised against 
these recue processes. For instance, although pre-packs have been credited for offering 
the best chance for more business rescue, maximising returns and value for creditors and 
saving jobs,91 ethical and social issues such as disenfranchisement of minor trade and 
general unsecured creditors like employees, secrecy in the dealings that lead up to the 
sale of the business and phoenix practices, among others, still need addressing.92  
 
88 Moreover, there are engaging debates on what the main aim of pre-pack business 
sales in the UK is and it is arguably, to maximise value or returns to creditors on 
corporate insolvency93 against other objectives such as employment protection. 
Stakeholders with interests in the debtor company would not be arguing against pre-
packs if they maximised every stakeholder’s wealth or served every stakeholder’s 
interest fairly where doing so was on a fair and equal level of involvement for all, 
especially in the operation and decision making process.  
 
89 There is still huge concern that because pre-packs are generally agreed in 
consultations with secured creditors such as banks, company directors and sometimes 
the management, they take the interests of the directors or management and secured 
creditors ahead of general unsecured stakeholders like employees. Moreover, the nature 
of secrecy involved and the speedy sale of the business often leave employees not 
consulted or informed of the sale on time.  
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90 Although Statement of Insolvency Practice (“SIP 16”) requires that general unsecured 
creditors are consulted and informed of the terms and the reasons as to why the pre-pack 
was chosen as the most effective rescue procedure, they usually receive this information 
after the business sale is completed. At this point, practices such as a phoenix sale of the 
business may have been exercised but not challenged. This raises questions as to whether 
the market was effectively explored to ascertain best offer for the business. Open 
marketing of the business may have been avoided due to the speedy and secretive nature 
of pre-packs yet ethical issues, especially on the transparency and open marketing of the 
business are heavily emphasised by SIP16.94  
 
91 In order to balance the interests of all stakeholders during corporate insolvency, 
principles of fairness, equality and justice, have to be adopted by law and policy makers 
to achieve the level of moral obligation of those applying the law, either in adjudication 
or overall enforcement to achieve collectivity and inclusion.95 This is the moral 
obligation borne with fairness, equality and justice that entices parties to enter into 
contractual agreements. The main goal of insolvency law would be to fairly and equally 
allocate resources or returns to all stakeholders based on these ideals. 
 
92 An insolvency regime whose laws and policies are not built on the notions of  fairness, 
equality and justice in consideration to value (contribution) would defeat the aims the 
laws set out to achieve in that jurisdiction. This would defeat the Cork Committee’s 
vision that the basic objective of insolvency law is “to support the maintenance of 
commercial morality and encourage the fulfilment of financial obligations.”96 Therefore, 
in order to achieve collectivity, the interests of all parties including other constituents 
like employees must be consistently pursued collectively and reasonably in line with 
other secured creditors such as banks and insolvency practitioners. 
 
93 Therefore, insolvency regimes built on the principles of fairness, equality and justice 
of inclusion and consideration of interests would inform and influence policy makers to 
treat all stakeholder interests fairly irrespective of whether those stakeholders have a 
direct or non- direct financial interest in the company business. Through the normative 
theories discussed above, legislative bodies and policy makers of a state are able to 
evaluate and analyse laws and policies and their impact on the economic and social 
welfare of the businesses and parties connected with them. 
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